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DIVERSITY DRIFT
Jonathan P. Feingold*

I. INTRODUCTION
Diversity may be under attack in the age of Trump, but higher
education in America has its own diversity problem. If mission
statements and strategic plans offer any guidance, many of America’s
colleges and universities actively value diversity.1 Yet even as calls
for diversity grow, these calls far too often lack a clear and coherent
normative anchor. Institutions often seek “diversity” without first
having done the work to define, precisely, why they want diversity, or
to identify, concretely, what sorts of diversity will get them there.
As a result, universities have become susceptible to diversity
drift, whereby good intentions invite unintended—and at times,
perverse—consequences. Seemingly innocuous language (as simple
as calls to hire and admit “diverse people”),2 for instance, risks
reifying whiteness as an institutional baseline against which
students and faculty of color are rendered perpetual outsiders. And
untethered to history, context, and power, calls for diversity can fall
victim to false equivalencies that deny any principled distinction
between those who would #TakeAKnee to honor Black lives and those
who travel the college circuit to mock, demean, and insult.

*. Research Fellow, BruinX | Special Assistant to the Vice Chancellor,
UCLA Equity, Diversity and Inclusion. Jonathan Feingold holds a B.A. from
Vassar College and a J.D. from UCLA School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Regents Policy 4400: Policy on University of California Diversity
Statement,
UNIV.
OF
CAL.,
https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/governance/policies/4400.html
(last
visited Feb. 19, 2019); Diversity & Inclusion, UNIV. OF CONN.,
https://diversity.uconn.edu/# (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Mission Statement,
UNIV. OF OR., https://www.uoregon.edu/our-mission (last visited Feb. 18, 2019);
Diversity, UNIV. OF TEX., https://www.utexas.edu/about/diversity (last visited
Feb. 18, 2019).
2. See, e.g., Spencer Kornhaber, A Person Can’t Be ‘Diverse’, THE ATLANTIC
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/01/avaduvernay-oscars-so-white-diversity-academy-awards-language/429225/
(critiquing the Motion Picture Academy of America’s use of the phrase “diverse
members”).
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II. DIVERSITY’S ORIGINS
As troubling as it may be, the rise of diversity drift should not
surprise us. This contemporary phenomenon has doctrinal roots in
Regents of California v. Bakke,3 a 1978 decision that marked the
Supreme Court’s first major engagement with affirmative action in
higher education. Allen Bakke, a white male who had been rejected
from the UC Davis Medical School in consecutive years, argued that
the school’s race-conscious admissions program violated his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.4
Justice Powell, who authored the controlling opinion, found for
Bakke and struck down the challenged policy. In so doing, Justice
Powell rejected three rationales the Medical School had mobilized to
defend its admissions program.5
Critically, however, he
simultaneously embraced the Medical School’s final justification: the
pursuit of student body diversity.6 Thus, even as Bakke proved fatal
for the challenged policy, Justice Powell’s embrace of diversity left
open the door for affirmative action beyond. Indeed, as recently as
2016, the Supreme Court upheld affirmative action at the University
of Texas and reaffirmed the diversity rationale’s place within its equal
protection jurisprudence.7
Even if a pragmatic victory for affirmative action, Justice
Powell’s vision of diversity came with baggage. Specifically, Justice
Powell divorced diversity from the anti-racist projects that only
decades earlier had fueled the dismantling of state-sanctioned
exclusion and subordination across sectors of American life.8 Instead,
he advanced a market theory of diversity that neglected the
Fourteenth Amendment’s egalitarian instincts and instead centered
the First Amendment interests of predominately White institutions
and the students they had historically served.9 This pivot was, by
3. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. Id. at 276–78. Bakke also alleged that the Medical School’s admissions
policy violated the California Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. See id.
5. Id. at 306.
6. Id.
7. See Fisher v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (“Fisher I confirmed
that ‘the decision to pursue “the educational benefits that flow from student body
diversity” is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but
not complete, judicial deference is proper.’”).
8. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–13. See also Charles R. Lawrence III, Each
Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 770–71 (1997)
(“[Grounding the diversity rationale in the First Amendment] constitutionalizes
the power of a privileged educational establishment to determine what learning
shall be valued and who shall be taught.”); Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in
Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 416 n.170, 442 (1998) (“Because academic freedom
is a neutral principle favoring no particular substantive end, I do not believe it
provides an adequate constitutional basis for the diversity rationale.”).
9. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (“Thus, in arguing that its universities must
be accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the
‘robust exchange of ideas,’ petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional
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many accounts, politically savvy; by embracing an arguably shallow
vision of diversity that valued difference for difference sake, Justice
Powell offered a path to five votes on the Supreme Court and an
avenue for institutions to maintain race-conscious admissions
without implicating their own legacies of racial exclusion and
marginalization.10
III. RESISTING DIVERSITY DRIFT
Forty years later, the rhetoric of diversity appears entrenched
within the lexicon of higher education. For those committed to
building more equitable and inclusive institutions, this should be
viewed as progress. But to realize such aspirations, institutions must
break free from the conceptual confines of diversity bequeathed to us
in Bakke. As a point of departure, institutions should endeavor to
understand their particular diversity projects through an
intersectional lens that attends to, and is informed by, related
institutional commitments such as equality and inclusion.11 The goal
need not be a single, static, uncontested vision of diversity. To the
contrary, it may be vital—if not inevitable—for institutions to
reanimate un-interrogated visions of diversity by speaking to local
context, conflict, and history. Ultimately, to guard against diversity
drift, institutions would be wise to engage in an introspective project
that anchors diversity to a normative foundation that centers those
who have been, and remain, at the margins.
This is a project that could take many forms, and I offer but one
in this short essay. Specifically, I invite institutions to center and
celebrate the relationship between racial diversity and “equal
university membership,” a concept I employ elsewhere to capture
each university student’s interest in an equal opportunity to enjoy,
regardless of her race, the full benefits of university membership.12

interest, that of the First Amendment.”); Lewis H. LaRue, The Rhetoric of
Powell's Bakke, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 43, 45 (1981).
10. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1470, 1532 (2004) (“Even as he rejected a race-asymmetric or
antisubordination framework for interpreting the presumption against racial
classifications, Justice Powell offered the nation a master compromise in the
concept of ‘diversity’ itself—a framework that would allow limited voluntary raceconscious efforts at desegregation to continue, in a social form that would
preserve the Constitution as a domain of neutral principles.”).
11. Consider, for instance, UCLA’s faculty hiring guide, which explores the
related concepts of equity, diversity, and inclusion. See UCLA EQUITY, DIVERSITY
AND INCLUSION, SEARCHING FOR EXCELLENCE, EVIDENCE-BASED STRATEGIES FOR
EQUITABLE
AND
INCLUSIVE
FACULTY
HIRING
4–6
(2018),
https://ucla.app.box.com/v/searching-for-excellence (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
12. See Jonathan Feingold, Hidden in Plain Sight: A More Compelling Case
for Diversity, UTAH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (exploring the relationship
between racial diversity and each student’s interest in equal university
membership).
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In other words, we should care about racial diversity, in part, because
it promotes personal equality in the classroom.
IV. RETURNING TO THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CANON
To appreciate the relationship between diversity and personal
equality in the university, one need only return to Bakke. To buttress
his diversity rationale, Justice Powell drew heavily on the Harvard
College Admissions Plan, a document that outlined how and why
Harvard considered applicant race in its admissions process. Justice
Powell was so fond of the Harvard Plan that, in addition to quoting it
at length, he appended the entire document to his opinion.13
Mirroring Justice Powell’s first amendment framing, Harvard
valued diversity, including racial diversity, because of its ability to
promote the robust exchange of ideas in the classroom.14 Yet in ways
that often escape standard accounts of Bakke, Harvard’s interest in
diversity ran deeper. Specifically, Harvard recognized that if it failed
to admit a sufficient number of students of color, the few who it did
admit might encounter an institutional environment that would
deprive them of an education equal to their White peers. Harvard
explained:
10 or 20 black students . . . might also create a sense of isolation
among the black students themselves and thus make it more
difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential. . . .
[T]here is some relationship between numbers and achieving
the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and
between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for
those students admitted.15

This insight never penetrated Justice Powell’s core embrace of
diversity and its attending benefits. Nonetheless, it remains
embedded in his opinion, and offers a point of departure for a more
grounded and—to many—more normatively satisfying vision of
diversity. For institutions interested in fortifying and localizing
Harvard’s instincts, there are two natural places to turn: social
science and Supreme Court precedent.
V. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE
There is good reason to take Harvard’s instincts seriously.16 In
the years since Bakke, now well-established research on stereotype
13. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321–24.
14. See id.
15. Id. at 323.
16. Beyond the social science I discuss here, student testimony offers
additional insight into the identity-contingent burdens that attend to severe
underrepresentation in the university context. See Brief of UCLA School of Law
Students of Color as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 554405 (law students of
color across four at University of California law schools detailed their experiences
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threat and social identity threat reveal a clear link between
institutional environments and a student’s university experience.17
These two related, yet distinct phenomena broadly refer to the
psychological threat that an individual experiences when she fears
that she will be devalued or negatively stereotyped because of an
identity she holds.18
Three key insights from the social science deserve mention here.
First, these threats are environmentally contingent.19 In other words,
they arise not from some individual vulnerability inherent to a
person, but rather because that person finds herself in an
environment that signals that her success might be negatively
implicated because of an identity she holds.20
Second, numbers matter. Or more precisely, institutional
demographics—particularly along socially salient categories such as
race and gender—comprise one powerful cue that can either
exacerbate or ameliorate the likelihood of threat.21 When individuals

following the passage of Proposition 209, which effectively ended affirmative
action in California); see also Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical
Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197,
1199 (2010) (observing that “[u]nderrepresented minority students in states that
permit affirmative action encounter far less hostility and internal and external
stigma than students in anti-affirmative action states.”).
17. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Ingroup Experts and Peers as Social Vaccines Who
Inoculate the Self-Concept: The Stereotype Inoculation Model, 22 PSYCHOL.
INQUIRY 231, 232 (2011) (“Stereotype threat and social identity threat are known
to undermine performance in domains where one’s group is negatively
stereotyped and one’s belonging uncertain; over time, weak performance reduces
self-confidence in one’s ability (or self-efficacy) and leads individuals to withdraw
from the domain.”).
18. See, e.g., id.; David S. Yeager et al., Teaching a Lay Theory Before College
Narrows Achievement Gaps at Scale, 113 (24) PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E3341,
E3347 (2016); Mary C. Murphy et al., Signaling Threat: How Situational Cues
Affect Women in Math, Science, and Engineering Settings, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 879,
879 (2007); Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995).
19. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 18, at 879–80 (“[W]e contend that a person’s
vulnerability to identity threat need not be inherent to him or her. Instead,
situational cues may contribute to experiences of social identity threat among
groups potentially stereotyped in a setting—even when targets are interested,
confident, proven achievers in the relevant domain.”).
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., Valerie Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies:
How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans in Mainstream
Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 615, 615–18 (2008) (describing
how visible underrepresentation can produce identity contingencies and
compromise institutional trust); Michael Inzlicht & Talia Ben-Zeev, A
Threatening Intellectual Environment: Why Females Are Susceptible to
Experiencing Problem-Solving Deficits in the Presence of Males, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI.
365, 370 (2000) (“The data from the current study support the conclusion that the
presence of males constitutes a threatening intellectual environment for females
performing a math task, and specifically that women experience a greater deficit
in their math performance the more males there are in the environment.”).
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are visibly underrepresented in a particular domain, that
underrepresentation can itself signal that a person is not part of the
ingroup and may be judged through lenses warped by stereotypes.22
Third, these psychological threats do not merely reside within a
person’s head. Hundreds of laboratory and real world studies have
shown that they exact concrete and quantifiable consequences.23
When present, social identity threat and stereotype threat can
compromise an individual’s ability to learn, decrease rates of
academic and social engagement, and undermine academic
performance—even when a person is otherwise highly motivated and
prepared.24 In summary, and consistent with Harvard’s diagnosis,
there is a discernable link between “numbers and providing a
reasonable environment for those students admitted.”25
VI. BEYOND THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CANON
The social science offers a robust empirical foundation for
Harvard’s observations concerning the relationship between racial
diversity and equal university membership. But to fully appreciate
the normative and doctrinal appeal of diversity as a driver of equality,
it is helpful to return to the case law. I refer specifically to the
Supreme Court’s pre-Brown v. Board of Education desegregation
jurisprudence—an area of case law that too infrequently enters
contemporary conversations about diversity, affirmative action, and
equal protection.
On the same day in 1950, the Supreme Court struck down
segregatory regimes in higher education in Oklahoma and Texas.26
The Oklahoma decision featured George McLaurin, an African
American man who, following years of litigation, had won his right to
attend the University of Oklahoma Graduate School of Education.
Yet even after admission, McLaurin remained subject to race-based
conditions. As described by the Court:
[McLaurin was] assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row
specified for colored students; . . . assigned to a table in the
library on the main floor; and . . . permitted to eat at the same
time in the cafeteria as other students, although here again he
is assigned to a special table.27

McLaurin argued that these conditions violated his right to equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The university, in
22. See id.
23. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 879; Yeager et al., supra note 18, at E3342
fig.1.
24. See id.
25. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978).
26. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). For a more extended discussion of
McLaurin and Sweatt, see Feingold, supra note 12.
27. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640. The restrictions evolved over the course of
the litigation. See id.
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response, defended the conditions on the basis that they imposed, at
most, a nominal burden on McLaurin.28
The Supreme Court agreed that, in certain respects, the
restrictions were limited.29 Nonetheless, in a unanimous decision
authored by Justice Vinson, the Supreme Court determined that the
conditions rendered McLaurin’s education “unequal to that of his
classmates” and thereby violated his “personal and present right to
the equal protection of the laws.”30 Justice Vinson explained that the
restrictions “impair[ed] and inhibit[ed] his ability to study, to engage
in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession.”31 They also “signif[ied] that the
State, in administering the facilities it affords for professional and
graduate study, set[] McLaurin apart from the other students.”32 In
short, the conditions proved constitutionally infirm because they
deprived McLaurin an education equal to his white peers.33
Translated to the contemporary context, McLaurin reinforces the
appeal of a diversity rationale that centers the personal equality
interests of students of color.34 At its core, this decision reminds us
that basic equality concerns arise when institutional conditions
deprive certain students, because of their race, the full benefits of
university membership.35 Racial diversity, in turn, counters such
conditions by inscribing into the environmental landscape the
implicit message that all students belong, are valued, and will
succeed. Understood in this sense, racial diversity is integral to
higher education because it comprises one piece of a broader
institutional prerogative to ensure that all students, regardless of
their race, have an equal opportunity to enjoy the full benefits of
university membership.

28. Id.
29. Id. at 640–41.
30. Id. at 642.
31. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. It is true that McLaurin offers an imperfect analogy; formal policies that
segregate students by race are unlikely to arise in 2019. Nonetheless, McLaurin
offers a valuable precedential anchor to contemporary debates about diversity
and the merits of affirmative action.
35. Id. at 641–42.
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